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The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s first intelligence agency, was 
born in the extreme context of war. The legacy of the OSS inherited by the CIA can result 
in mistakes from wartime risk in peacetime action, as well as independence and creativity 
that can produce the greatest success. In undertaking missions to achieve the impossible, 
innovative individuals developed creative solutions to gather information and accomplish 
missions to provide Allied policy makers with the edge they needed to win the war. This 
paper evaluates individuals and cases to identify how risk was measured and undertaken 
in wartime in order to understand its impact on organizations in a time of peace.  
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“Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. Likewise, information 
is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose. – William Donovan”1 
 
The OSS left a legacy that would become the foundation of the CIA and Special 
Forces. OSS was born in the extreme circumstances of global war and staffed by 
“Glorious Amateurs.” This context contributed to the organization’s willingness to 
innovate and to accept risk. The defining characteristics of the individuals who shaped 
the OSS and they way they evaluated risk would define the legacy inherited by the CIA, 
and are essential to replicating this success. This report aims to answer the major 
questions diagrammed below. 
 
 









Chapter 1: Process Mapping 
This report uses process mapping as a tool to understand lessons from the case 
studies and the major personalities involved at different levels within the institutional 
hierarchy of the OSS. Intentionally asking broad questions regarding various elements of 
OSS operational methods allows this paper to explore what the success of individual 
operators taught senior officers at the highest levels of the OSS planning process, and 
how those lessons translated into the cornerstones of operational procedure. Cases and 
individuals were chosen intentionally to utilize individual illustrations to describe the 
decision-making process and structure of the OSS as a whole.  
Each case opens with an overview of the operation, followed by a discussion of 
the major personalities and interpersonal dynamics involved in the operation. The cases 
are then analyzed in four categories: context, success, reward, and impact, through the 




Figure 1.2: Primary Case Study Questions. 
Analyzing the process from the overview at the highest levels of administrative 
planning to the focused perspective of individual operators provides a comprehensive 
examination of OSS measures of risk and success. This allows for deeper examinations of 
long-term implications. Also, by analyzing the results of innovation, one can identify 
trends applicable today. 
 
                                                
1 “Coordinator of Information, 1941.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: The 












Chapter 2: The Beginnings of the OSS 
COI and the Birth of the OSS 
“Into the breach rushed OSS”—R. Harris Smith2 
 
President Roosevelt appointed William Donovan as the Coordinator of 
Information (COI) on July 1th, 1941, to act as the head of an information gathering 
civilian office, reporting directly to the White House.3 Thomas Troy, a historian of the 
COI, described it as follows,  “a novel attempt in American history to organize research, 
intelligence, propaganda, subversion, and commando operations as a unified and essential 
feature of modern warfare; a ‘Fourth Arm’ of the military services.”4  
The success of the COI ultimately led to its division. Donovan’s thorough 
recruiting process to find the best staff with experience and cultural understanding led to 
quick success. His 10 million dollar budget did not hurt either.5 The ranks of his office 
soon rose to 600 staffers, and Donovan’s opponents’ distrust of the COI grew with it, 
especially from the FBI.6 In a skillful effort of diplomacy, Donovan and the Joint Chiefs 
negotiated a plan that would split the COI down the lines of “black” and “white” 
propaganda missions.7 Thus the War Office gained control of the attributable, “white” 
propaganda, and COI Foreign Information Service was rebranded as the Office of 
Strategic Service (OSS), overseeing radio broadcasting and additional “black” 
propaganda missions.8 This deal served to officially establish the OSS position within the 
wartime apparatus and create connections to military support and resources, “JCS 
155/2/D officially made OSS the military’s psychological warfare agency, which meant 
Donovan would be supplied with military manpower for his otherwise civilian agency.”9 
The new arrangement also served to clearly define the scope of the mission of the OSS, 
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and to clearly separate it from the highest levels of military information and domestic 
counterintelligence.10 More of Donovan’s vision for this organization can be seen in his 
proposal in Appendix A at the end of this report. 
Donovan realized his organization would have to establish its relevance and 
ability to contribute to the Allied war-effort based on its own ability to gather and analyze 
intelligence. He immediately dispatched agents to missions and countries around the 
globe. This organization that started with one man would grow to almost 13,000 men and 
women at its peak, and it would spend approximately 135 million dollars in its four-year 
life span, the equivalent of 1.1 billion dollars today.11 The peak of the OSS is reflected in 
the organizational chart of Figure 1.3 below. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: OSS Organization at its Peak12 
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Recruiting Donovan’s Dreamers 
“They also held a basic faith in human progress and the ability of ‘common men’ to 
improve the world through a common effort.”—R. Harris Smith13   
 
The success of the OSS was a result of the people who worked there. Often they 
were the men and women who did not always fit into traditional warfare. The original 
recruits who found their way into the COI were those with the expertise immediately 
needed, whether that was knowledge of countries, culture, climate, terrain, politics or 
industry.14 A report from OSS psychological staff noted, “OSS undertook and carried out 
more different types of enterprises calling for more varied skills than any other single 
organization of its size in the history of our country.”15 
Donovan’s hope for OSS officers was that they would be “calculatingly reckless” 
with “disciplined daring” and “trained for aggressive action.”16 These operators were 
considered to be the best of the best, referred to by many as the “Glorious Amateurs.”  
“Two-thirds of OSS personnel came out of the military, among them highly qualified 
volunteers for risky, unconventional missions not further described. The rest of the 
workforce was civilian and included many of the most prominent academics in 
America.”17 
These individuals would need to operate independently, and often without a plan 
in dangerous situation. They had no playbook to follow; every mission would be unique. 
They would have to define risk, define success, and act accordingly. 
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What Lessons did the OSS Learn? Standard Operating Procedures 
“At its best, OSS training produced officers who were fit and confident, able to think for 
themselves and act decisively under enormous stress.”—Center for the Study of 
Intelligence18 
 
As an organization growing from nothing, the OSS had to create standard 
operating procedures and training programs, “Quickly improvised to meet wartime needs, 
training in the OSS was forever in a state of flux and change. It could at one and the same 
time, seem haphazard and deadly serious.”19 As this report looked for standard operating 
procedures within the OSS, they were difficult to find, “Standard operating procedures 
were almost taboo in OSS. Effective action was the sole objective.” While effective 
action was quintessential to OSS success, it was not always efficient, “Inevitably, 
activism also meant waste. Donovan procured for OSS an unlimited (and largely 
unvouchered) budget that ran into the hundreds of millions during the four years of the 
war.”20 But because the OSS had such a unique mission, the name of the game was trial 
and error; it is not fair to classify this spending as wasteful.21  
Donovan himself spoke out against planning on a trip to London, “Gentlemen, I 
find that here in London you have been doing too much planning. Plans are no good on 
the day of battle. I ask you to throw your plans out the window.”22 However, this does not 
mean they were completely unprepared. The OSS functioned with more of a toolkit than 
an operating manual (though they did have a handbook, Illustration 1.1). By preparing 
skills to call upon, they allowed for flexibility, as things rarely go as planned. With 
experience comes knowledge, and as the level of training reflected that, “Others 
remembered it as physically challenging and surprisingly professional, especially toward 
the end of the war, when it reflected lessons learned from the field and increasing 
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standardization.”23  Along these lines, this report will explore how the OSS understood 
risk and viewed success in an effort to establish a baseline for lessons learned. 
 
 
Illustration 1.1: OSS Handbook24 
 
Context and Knowledge 
“Intelligence is an activity which consists, essentially, of three functions. 
Information has to be acquired; it has to be analyzed and interpreted; and it has to be put 
into the hands of those who can use it.”- F.H. HInsley, author of British Intelligence in 
the Second World War.25 
 
The OSS was born in a time of war. At odds with every other organization and 
department, OSS operated in the moment with a freedom that some considered reckless, 
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but could only stem from rapid decision-making and goal-oriented creativity. Most of its 
competitors had spent years developing best practices and contacts. Starting at such a 
deficit, the OSS needed to gain ground quickly if they were to provide Allied policy 
makers with information resulting in a decision advantage. 
Risk in an extreme context is very different than that of peace. In war, the 
consequences of inaction are greater, often eclipsing the risks of failure:  
“The chaotic administration of a dynamic, unimaginable wartime secret service 
proved dangerous in an era of uneasy peace. During a World War, Donovan had 
felt, justifiably, that the smallest success would probably outweigh the greatest 
blunder. In the nuclear age, the most minute blunder—a reconnaissance flight 
detected or an espionage operation ‘blown’—could lead to irreparable disaster.”26 
Intelligence collection would be needed after the war, and the OSS would leave its mark 
on it. During war, failure is accepted as less of a risk, “But America was locked in a war 
for its very survival, and R&D chief Stanley Lovell felt that no idea could be overlooked: 
‘It was my policy to consider any method whatever that might aid the war, however 
unorthodox or untried.’ Failures were accepted as a cost of doing business.”27 In 
peacetime, the perception of failure can be very different. This report will evaluate the 
extreme context through the case studies in an effort to understand this impact. 
 
The OSS Today 
The strength of the OSS was not only in having smart people, but having people 
who are passionate, and willing to lay their lives on the line again. The legacy of the OSS 
is clearly seen within the CIA Credo in Appendix E, and the description of courage in the 
CIA Ethos, “We accomplish difficult, high-stakes, often dangerous tasks. In executing 
mission, we carefully manage risk but we do not shy away from it. We value sacrifice 
and honor our fallen.”28 
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A Profile: William “Wild Bill” Donovan 
“General Donovan possessed the ‘power to visualize an oak when he saw an acorn,’”—
OSS Psychological Staff29 
 
 
Illustration 2.1: Picture of William Donovan30 
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While General Donovan is not completely responsible for the culture of the OSS, 
his impact cannot be overstated. As the OSS was his and President Roosevelt’s 
brainchild, he was involved from the beginning, seeing it through until Truman disbanded 
it after the war’s end. He knew that his civilian agency would need to operate differently 
from military intelligence organizations. He gave his men the freedom to do so, “In every 
case, Donovan supported his officers. He had given his men their freedom of action and 
he would not allow them to be punished for exercising it with enthusiasm.”31 
Donovan was responsible for the overarching strategy of the OSS, but he was also 
known for visiting his men and missions in the field. One anecdote that exemplifies 
Donovan was his involvement in the invasion of Normandy. Expressly forbidden to join 
the invasion force as he knew too much about American intelligence operations, he 
appealed the decision, and when rejected again, he found his way ashore with the 
invasion through “other devious means.”32 He told Colonel David Bruce, who travelled to 
the front with him, “You and I are old and expendable. What better end for us than to die 
in Normandy with enemy bullets in our bellies?”33 When he received an injury near his 
jugular vein in his neck, he kept advancing, looking for the agents he hoped to 
rendezvous with. When he and Bruce became pinned down by enemy machine-gun fire, 
Bruce recounts the following exchange: 
“Flattened out, the general turned to me and said: ‘David we mustn’t be captured, 
we know too much.’ ‘Yes, Sir,’ I answered mechanically. ‘Have you your pill?’ 
he demanded. I confessed I was not carrying the instantaneous death pellet 
concocted by our scientific adviser… ‘Never mind,’ replied the resourceful 
general, ‘I have two of them.’ Thereupon still lying prone, he disgorged the 
contents of all his pockets. There were a number of hotel keys, a passport, 
currency of several nationalities, photographs of grandchildren, travel orders, 
newspaper clippings, and heaven knows what else, but no pills. ‘Never mind,’ 
said Donovan, “we can do without them, but if we get out of here, you must send 
a message to Gibbs, the Hall Porter at Claridges in London, telling him on no 
account to allow servants in the hotel to touch some dangerous medicines in my 
 12 
bathroom.’”  
“This humanitarian disposition having been made… Donovan whispered to me: ‘I 
must shoot first.’ Yes, Sir,’ I responded, ‘but can we do much against machine-
guns with our pistols?’ ‘Oh, you don’t understand,’ he said. ‘I mean if we are 
about to be captured I’ll shoot you first. After all, I am your Commanding 
Officer.’”34 
Both men survived this encounter, and luckily no pills or bullets were needed for 
such an untimely end. But this anecdote represents the fearlessness (which some may 
consider carelessness) that Donovan embodied, and that his men imitated. His 
determination would serve him and the OSS well. He wore what must have been very 
heavy mantels of mastermind and inspiration for the OSS. DCI William Webster said of 
Donovan when dedicating a statue of him,  
"To those of us here today, this is General Donovan's greatest legacy. He realized 
that a modern intelligence organization must not only provide today's tactical 
intelligence, it must provide tomorrow's long-term assessments. He recognized 
that an effective intelligence organization must not allow political pressures to 
influence its counsel. And, finally, he knew that no intelligence organization can 
succeed without recognizing the importance of people—people with discretion, 
ingenuity, loyalty, and a deep sense of responsibility to protect and promote 
American values."35 
Donovan’s role in the context, success, reward, and impact of the OSS echoes in the 
legacy of OSS today. 
 



















































MISSION REVIEW CASE STUDIES 
“OSS was expected, much as we are now, to make sense of a world in turmoil and, where 
possible, to change it for the better. The methods to accomplish that mission were—and 
still are—as broad as the mission itself… Whatever the means, the goal was always the 
same: To reach behind the battle lines, either to learn about the enemy or to attack him 
directly. To strike in any possible way, by giving our fighting forces the advantage of 
intelligence or by giving resistance movements the advantages of equipment, training, 
and—most of all—hope.”—A. B. Krongard, Former Executive Director of the CIA36 
 
The following case studies were chosen to reflect different elements of OSS 
operations. They intentionally represent different levels of risk and action to capture a 
holistic picture of the operations. The individuals essential to these missions also span 




Chapter 3: Norway 
Special Operations Groups (OGs) 
“None pretended they could win the cause by themselves, but all committed themselves to 
provide that extra effort that could ensure the success of the whole strategy.”—William 
E. Colby37 
 
The major missions in Norway reflect the difficult work of Special Operations 
Groups (OGs):  
“OGs were the ‘infantry of the OSS.’ They were uniformed military personnel 
formed into hard hitting units that would operate deep behind enemy lines, 
conducting sabotage upon Axis forces and not necessarily dependent upon the 
resources of resistance groups already in place. The OGs were trained in 
parachuting, demolitions, weaponry, commando tactics, communications, 
amphibious warfare, and skiing.”38 
The descendants of this group include today’s U.S. Special Forces and the CIA’s 
Special Activities Division, among others. The information surrounding OGs was not 
declassified until 1987, so the majority of the historical analysis is relatively new and has 
the benefit of hindsight in understanding it.39 Eventually three OGs would be formed; 
Norwegians, French, and Italians, with two sections per group, consisting of two squads 8 
men per section.40 
The individuals who comprised the OG teams were unbelievably brave, accepting 
a role considered to be barely a step up from a suicide mission. The soldiers were 
required to pay off all equipment and all civilian debt before departing, and they were 
encouraged to review their wills and make other preparations.41 
OG units were different from U.S. Rangers or British Commandos:  
“Initially, Commandos and Rangers focused on hit-and-run or smash-and-grab 
raids aimed at creating maximum damage and confusion in enemy territory for a 
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short amount of time…The OG and SO teams on the other hand were expected to 
be efficient, mobile, and self-sufficient units capable of infiltrating deep into 
enemy territory, making contact with local resistance groups, and converting them 
into guerrilla units.”42 
They endured strength, survival, and first-aid training, as well as in 
reconnaissance and infiltration.43 They also learned how to travel undetected, using maps, 
compasses, and terrain features and received mechanical training in case they needed to 
repair an enemy vehicle while on mission.44 
 
Jedburgh Teams 
“Surprise, kill, and vanish.” 
- Motto of the Jedburgh teams45 
 
It is impossible to discuss OG groups without paying homage to the Jedburghs. 
These were three-men multinational teams, which were sent behind enemy lines in 
France to support the French resistance. The name Jedburghs replaced the original code-
name of “Jumpers,” but why “Jedburghs” was specifically chosen remains and bit of a 
mystery.46 
Eighty-three teams parachuted in to integral parts of France in a five-month time 
span from June to October 1944, comprised of, “286 Jedburghs, 83 Americans, 90 
British, 103 French, 5 Belgians, and 5 Dutch.”47 Team Hugh was the first sent to France 
on 5/6 June 1944, and all American and British Jedburghs were recalled on 13 October 
1944.48 They collected information, and coordinated and trained the French resistance. 
Their exploits are heroic and extensive, but most relevant for this project, Jedburgh 
mission also served as a training ground for following OG missions, and especially 
Operation RYPE that came after. 
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Building the NORSO Group 
“Developed by the American Office of Strategic Services under Major General William 
J. Donovan, it reflected his conviction that America’s polyglot population stemming from 
its immigrants was a strength, not a weakness.”- William E. Colby49 
 
The 99th Infantry Battalion, constituted on July 10, 1942, would be comprised of 
931 enlisted men, intended to be comprised largely of those of Norwegian decent.50 The 
idea stemmed from Donovan’s idea that, “specially trained ethnic units could be used 
deep behind enemy lines in unconventional roles.”51 Pulling from Norwegian Nationals 
fleeing Nazi-controlled Norway, as well as Norwegian Americans. The ability to speak 
Norwegian was required, though fluency varied.52  
Shortly after the establishment of the 99th, OSS recruiting officers arrived, 
searching for candidates willing to take on “extra-hazardous duty behind enemy lines in 
Norway.”53 They were specifically to be trained in “airborne operations, amphibious 
warfare, commando tactics, weapons, demolition, radio communications, jungle-type 
warfare, skiing, mountain climbing, and would possess language skills appropriate for 
areas where they would operate.”54 After the NORSO group “’invaded’ Martha’s 
Vineyard,” for training exercises, they headed to Wales in 1943 to completely their 
training and await assignment.55 After months of waiting for a mission to Norway, the 
NORSO group would be sent to France.56 It would not be until October 1944, that 
William Colby would take command the NORSO group would be able to turn their 
attention to Norway.57 
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Operation RYPE 
“…if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a 
knowledge of both of the related languages and techniques, would yield valuable and 
often decisive results.— William Donovan”58 
 
 
Illustration 4.1: William Colby and the NORSO Group59 
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Colby signed Field Order no. 1, estimating Germans were travelling on a single 
railroad from North to South, carrying a possible 500 men a day, with garrisons and 
ammunition along the route.60 A drop zone was to be chosen, and the intended target was 
a section from Lurundal to Formofoss, with a section from Grong to Majavatn as a back-
up, and the Grana bridge south of Agle would be added as a primary target.61 Colby said, 
“The railroad—the Nordland—a single-track affair between Narvik and Trondheiin 
carried thousands of [German] troops Reichward each day, and daily gained in capacity. 
Like Carthage, this had to be destroyed.”62 It was essential to prevent the return of 
German troops to the Western front, which would have been devastating to Allied forces. 
The first attempt for a drop failed due to weather conditions, this was a stroke of 
luck because the intended drop had somehow been compromised and German patrols 
were searching the intended landing area.63 Four out of nine planes successfully dropped 
personnel and equipment at the RYPE site, where five members of the Norwegian 
resistance members lit an L-shaped fire to signal the drop zone and met them.64 Sixteen 
men landed on target, but five were dropped accidentally into neutral Sweden, resulting 
in capture and secret internment.65 According to the Center for Intelligence Study, this 
mission, ““…was the first and only combined ski-parachute operation ever mounted by 
the US Army.”66 
After reconnaissance, Colby had concerns about the group’s ability to sabotage 
the target, Grana Bridge, without reinforcements. But when it became clear 
reinforcements could not come, he wanted to move forward with the plan anyway.67 The 
situation continued to decline, and the mission to attack Grana Bridge was aborted, but it 




A Profile: William Colby 





Illustration 4.2: Picture of William Colby69 
 
One of the most iconic operators of these missions was William Colby, who 
would play a major role in the Vietnam war, and ultimately become a Director of Central 
Intelligence in the 70s.  
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Ironically, Colby, an Irish Catholic, had no connection to Norway. But he grew up 
surrounded by Scandinavians, and he was well acquainted with skiing.70 He was placed 
on a Jedburgh team based on his experience with jump school and knowledge of French. 
He was code-named “Berkshire” on the Jedburgh missions and was only 24 years old.71 
His experience there would lead to his role in NORSO. He led Operation RYPE. 
Colby had to determine the targets on the ground based on available resources. 
Managing his own officers and the resistance members he was working with, as well as 
minimal radio contact with the base back in London, he had to make decisions 
independently. His judgment would determine the success and impact of the mission. His 
ability to lead independently and develop rapid and efficient solutions are prototypical of 




“To think that General Eisenhower thought enough of our little village to send an 
American officer here to help us.”—An eighty-year-old Frenchman to Jedburgh Michael 
Burke 72 
 
Norway was under enemy occupation. Risk/gain analysis within this case must 
balance the connection of many OGs to Norway and their desire to see it free and the 
interests of the war as a whole. Therefore, risk to mission is difficult to evaluate in this 
case. The primary objective had to be defined between freeing Norway from enemy 
occupation and winning the war. Obviously they often go hand in hand. But the OGs 
were sent to Norway to prevent German troops from returning to the continent, not 
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specifically to restore Norway. If that had been the goal, they would have likely been sent 
much sooner, as the OGs with a heritage connection to Norway had hoped. Risk to 
mission then became risk to the war, not risk to Norway. 
Risk to force was very high in Operation RYPE. As they were sent behind enemy 
lines, they were constantly at risk of death or capture. They would need to blend in and 
yet wear their uniforms in case of capture so as to be treated as a POW, and not executed 
as a spy. Hitler even sent out orders to the German forces that any sort of commando 
captured was to be shot immediately, even in uniform or surrendering.73 The gain was 
that such a small force could be as effective, or more effective, than a larger conventional 
unit under certain circumstances. Ultimately fewer lives would be at risk. 
The NORSO group had been unaware that the Reichkommissar, Josef Terboven, 
had committed to killing ten innocent Norwegians for every German killed by the 
Norwegian Resistance, and even worse, he was willing to shoot 10,000 Norwegians for 
every attack on the railway.74 As German occupying forces in Norway were committing 
such atrocities, this partially explains why missions to Norway were chosen so carefully 
compared to other theaters. The risk to non-combatants was extremely high, and the 
Allies could not risk losing the support of the Norwegians and the Norwegian resistance. 
The risk to non-combatants and the mission and morale of the Norwegian resistance 
required deep consideration from Allied planners. Action in Norway would be avoided 
until the shift of German divisions toward the continent and Western front met a 




“But this perfection can be realized only by planning, and planning is dependent 
upon accurate information.”—William Donovan75 
 
Success was a changing metric in Operation RYPE, the targets and situation 
constantly changed with new information and changing resources. Success in this mission 
can be summarized as do as much un-attributable damage as possible and to get back 
safely. Lives were lost in simply delivering OGs to Norway.76 They would not all make it 
back safely, but they would cause damage across the Norwegian rail system and they 
prevented German soldiers from leaving Norway to other fronts. 
Colby and his men received accolades and honors, and despite a few challenges, 
the mission succeeded, “The 109 double charges destroyed 218 rails, for a distance of 
two and one-half kilometers. The mission was a complete success.”77  
 
Reward 
“Clearly the OSS NORSO Group was composed of patriots.”—Bruce H. Heimark78 
 
The plan was all action, “We would seize a train, board it, throw her into reverse 
and blow up every tunnel and bridge we could until ammunition had run out; then drive 
the train into a ditch. We hoped to succeed by sheer bravado.”79 This action was 
rewarded in Norway, just as it was in France. 
Instead of simply waiting, the NORSO group gained valuable experience by 
joining the Jedburghs as they jumped into France. “The OGs provided the military 
discipline by example to the Maquis while in field operations. It paid off during the 
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PATRICK mission when the OGs would not retreat from withering enemy fire, and the 
Maquis stayed with them.”80 The OGs learned how to work with local resistance forces to 
accomplish strategic goals in France and we see this repeated in Norway. 
Operation RYPE also rewarded the loyalty of their resistance compatriots and 
increased cooperation between them. Colby made an effort to understand the needs of the 
locals, and even had canned pineapple delivered in a supply drop, as he corrected 
discerned the pineapple’s role in boosting the morale of the locals.81 They also learned 
that they had a significant advantage over German soldiers on skis, and focused their 
efforts on winter operations, until they eventually had to trade their skis for jeeps.82 
 
Impact 
“In this Post-Cold War atmosphere of reshaping international and national affairs to 
meet the new challenges of a new age, it is highly relevant to review how an earlier 
generation faced up to and organized itself to meet the challenges of its age.”—  
William E. Colby83 
 
Ultimately eight attacks on Norwegian railways would take place between April 
15 and 28, 1945, preventing 150,000 German soldiers from retreating to the continent and 
possibly prolonging the war.84 But the NORSO group’s impact was not limited to their 
actions in Norway, it can also clearly be seen through their contributions to the success of 
the Jedburgh missions. Many Allied military leaders did not value the OSS at the 
beginning of the war, as their missions made an impact, their value cannot be ignored, 
“Patton said that the OSS did not shorten the war by a ‘goddamn minute.’ Yet Oistad 
read that 20,000 German troops were killed or captured when the main Allied units from 
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the north and south joined in central France, setting the trap. Oistad argues that surely 
Patton used OSS reports that located German units during his sweep through France.”85 
The OGs’ contribution, when compared to that of large troop divisions, could be as 
effective, under the right circumstances, for less risk and less cost, “Leif Eide said they 
were in contact with Germans every day, and the OGs had more than their share in killing 
or capturing them with only three OG casualties.”86 
The idea that 24 men could prevent the return of 150,000 German troops is almost 
absurd. Operation RYPE did not destroy Grana Bridge, but the damage they did along the 
way exponentially justifies their presence, and saved lives on both sides as the war 
reached its end. 
 













45 “Surprise, Kill, Vanish: The Legend of the Jedburghs.” (Central Intelligence Agency: 
2015). 
46 Ibid. and Mendelsohn, J. (Ed.). “Covert warfare : intelligence, counterintelligence, and 
military deception during the World War II era.” (Vol. 4). (New York: Garland 

















58 “Coordinator of Information, 1941,” 3. “Coordinator of Information, 1941.” Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Papers as President: The President's Secretary's File (PSF), 1933-1945. 
Box 128, 3. Primary Document. 
59 Center for the Study of Intelligence. “William Colby and the NORSO Group.” (Central 
Intelligence Agency: Washington D.C.). Image. 
60	Ibid.	64.	
61	Ibid.	67.	
62Colby, W. E. “OSS Operation Norway: Skis and Daggers.” Central Intelligence 
































Chapter 4: Switzerland 
Planning Operation SUNRISE 
“Switzerland is now, as it was in the last war, the one most advantageous place for the 
obtaining of information concerning the European Axis powers.”—William Donovan87 
 
Negotiations surrounding Operation SUNRISE began on March 8, 1945.88 When 
they realized defeat in Italy was imminent, General Wolff and other SS officers hoped to 
save German lives and save Italian history and art by negotiating surrender, rather than 
having to enforce a scorched-Earth policy as they retreated back to Germany. Wolff’s 
men also oversaw the mountains that held essential paths leading to Germany and 
beyond.89 These would be valuable as the Allies continued to move toward Germany. 
The determining factor would be time, as all parties knew an Allied invasion was 
imminent and fast approaching.90 Once the Allied force landed, such a surrender plan 
would be impossible.  
After several talks at locations along the Swiss-Italian border, close enough to 
hide the fact that Wolff was not at his post, Wolff travelled to Germany to enlist the help 
of General Kesserling in convincing the remaining General stationed in Italy, General 
Vietinghoff, to support the surrender. Kesserling agreed. Surrender looked promising, 
until Himmler noticed that General Wolff moved his family into territory that he himself 
controlled. Himmler called to tell him the move was imprudent, and that he “…had taken 
the liberty of correcting the situation.”91 This meant that Wolff would be under suspicion 
and closely watched by the SS, knowing his family’s lives were at stake. Wolff played 
the last card in his hand and decided to tell Himmler that he was negotiating in order to 
separate the Americans from the Russians. Then Wolff was told to report to Berlin.92 
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As all of this was occurring, Dulles was watching and reporting back. He 
requested officials be sent to facilitate the surrender if necessary, and continued to utilize 
his contacts in the Italian resistance to observe the situation. Then President Roosevelt 
died, and Truman decided maintaining wavering good relations with the Russians was a 
primary priority, and Truman felt the SUNRISE negotiations jeopardized this. On April 
21, 1945, while awaiting Wolff’s return from Berlin, Dulles received an order from the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff to break off all negotiations with German emissaries.93 Dulles 
explains this action further in his account of Operation SUNRISE: 
“But little did I realize from the brief references in the cable to ‘complications’ 
which had arisen with the Russians, that Moscow had accused President 
Roosevelt of double-dealing in the Italian surrender talks, that this had occasioned 
the bitterest verbal exchange the United States had yet had with Moscow, and that 
Stalin had beclouded the President’s last days with his false charges which 
Roosevelt told Stalin he considered to be ‘vile misrepresentations.’”94 
 
Surrender on a Precipice 
“Time after time the scheme came right to the edge of breakdown or disaster, but in the 
end SUNRISE succeeded, bringing about an early end to the Italian campaign in late 
April 1945—and saving hundreds if not thousands of lives.”—Center for the Study of 
Intelligence95 
 
Resigning himself to the operation’s failure, Dulles suddenly received a call from 
the Italian resistance, saying that Wolff was on his way with Lieutenant Colonel 
Schweinitz on behalf of Vietinghoff to Switzerland to sign the “…capitulation of all 
German forces—Wehrmacht and SS—in Northern Italy.”96 In the words of Dulles, “To 
say I was in a predicament was to put it mildly.” 
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Dulles had a decision to make, “Even to see the Germans would be a clear 
violation of instructions. Yet I was convinced that the Joint Chiefs would never have 
directed breaking off contact if they had know that the German envoys were already on 
their way to surrender.”97 He decided to radio back for guidance and proceed by slightly 
stalling the negotiations, but assuming they would move forward. 
As he waited for a reply, Dulles discovered how Wolff ingeniously escaped the 
wrath of Himmler. He carried with him a letter from his ally, German Ambassador to 
Italy, Rudolf Rahn, that implied the surrender negotiations were to achieve objectives set 
by Hitler himself, and action against Wolff would require answering to Hitler.98 When 
Himmler seemed to waiver, Wolff insisted they go to speak with Hitler, and Himmler 
retreated asking not to accompany him.99 When Wolff met with Hitler, he explained his 
failure to report back was as to provide Hitler with plausible deniability.”100 
While Dulles continued to wait for orders, his team intercepted a message from 
Himmler to Wolff ordering that no negotiations take place.101 Wolff responded by saying, 
“What Himmler has to say now makes no difference.”102 On April 27, three cables 
arrived to Dulles marked “TRIPLE PRIORITY,” which is the highest priority. This cable 
reversed all of the previous stop orders.103 The final negotiations took place at Caserta, 
and the surrender was to go into effect on May 2, 1945 at 2:00 PM Central European 
Time.104 It would soon be discovered that Hitler committed suicide the very same day.105 
All seemed settled when Dulles got word that the Swiss border had been closed. 
This trapped the signing German generals in Italy, who were now in danger because they 
were considered traitorous by German forces for surrendering. He quickly used his 
contacts to create a path for them.106 The Allies needed confirmation that all German 
parties in Italy were enforcing surrender before hostilities could cease, and the final 
concerns would be relieved by communications from Wolff relayed by a German-
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A Profile: Allen Dulles 
“Allen Dulles was born to high affairs of state.”—Center for the Study of Intelligence108 
 
 
Illustration 4.1: Picture of Allen Dulles109 
Allen Dulles began his career in intelligence in WWII by serving as a COI station 
chief on the 36th floor of the Rockefeller Center in New York.110 Dulles was sent to Bern, 
Switzerland to set up an intelligence network, thus keeping a finger on the pulse of 
Europe. He made connections of every nationality and developed agents ranging from 
American journalist Mary Bancroft to German officers. Code-named Agent 110, he 
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would act as the station chief in Bern from 1942-1945.111 He was born in New York, 
went to Princeton, and then became a lawyer after working for the U.S. Foreign 
Service.112 He very much matched the typical gentleman-spy stereotype that was often 
assigned to members of the OSS. 
After successfully operating in Switzerland for the majority of the war, Dulles 
would establish and oversee the new OSS Station in Germany.113 His time in the CIA as 
DCI following WWII is marked by considerable cooperation with his brother John Foster 
Dulles who served as Secretary of State at the same time. He oversaw highpoints in the 
development of the U-2 plane and the Corona satellite, and also presided over the 
creation of Radio Free Europe, and incidents including the Bay of Pigs.114 
Dulles’ OSS contribution shaped the way the Allies approached Europe in WWII. 





“Could there be an orderly German surrender, or would we be left with chaos and a 
vacuum of power in those parts of Europe left by the retreating Nazi Armies? From 
reports reaching us, it was clear that when the German military defenses finally 
crumbled, Hitler hoped to drag all of Europe down with him.”—Allen Dulles115 
 
Negotiating surrender was a massively risky situation. The Allies could not pass 
up such an opportunity, though wary of the German officers. If word of the negotiation 
got out, Russia would not be happy with U.S. actions, threatening an already rocky 
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partnership. General Wolff and the other SS officers negotiating surrender would likely 
be killed if word of their negotiations made it back to Germany. Dulles needed to know 
the offer of surrender was genuine, and that there was support at the highest levels before 
he could move forward. 
One of the most essential elements of the risk/gain analysis in this case is that 
Dulles tested General Wolff by asking for the release of two of the highest-level prisoners 
in Italy.116 A decision to release of these prisoners would not be made lightly. Wolff’s 
decision to do so showed Dulles that working with Wolff would be worth the high risk, 
because of the possibility of such a high gain, “I then decided that it was worth the 
gamble to see Wolff myself, in full recognition of the fact that considerable risk was 
involved. It would probably be the first meeting to discuss peace between a commanding 
German officer and an Allied official since the war began.”117 
 
Success 
“We have found in all our work that the communications man often is the key to the 
success of a mission.”—William Donovan118 
 
Success in this mission was two-pronged. Minimize losses of people and 
resources in Italy, and maintain good relations with Russia. Each could not be 
accomplished without the other. And the unconditional surrender of German forces 
would very easily accomplish both of these objectives. 
Intelligence collection and dissemination is also successful, as Dulles gathered the 
information of a potential surrender, he cultivated it and asked relevant questions, and he 
reported relevant information to the decision-makers, thereby convincing them that action 
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was required. When new information presented itself in the form of the surrender 
proposal after he had been ordered to cease negotiations, he re-evaluated, reported back 
to the decision-maker, and operated in what he believed to be their best interests while 
awaiting further instructions. He was able to collect information that gave his policy-
makers “decision advantage,” successfully fulfilling his role of intelligence officer. 
At first glance, it looks as if General Wolff did most of the heavy lifting. But 
without the consistent support and management of Dulles, he would not have had the 
stability and commitment to see through the surrender. Dulles and his team managed 
quietly from the background, the early version of a CIA Case Officer. He facilitated 
conditions favorable to his preferred outcome, and accurately identified and acted upon 
vital hinge points in a developing situation. 
 
Reward 
“Despite the unconditional surrender policy, higher authority in Washington allowed 
Allen Dulles to meet with SS general Karl Wolff, who had secretly offered to broker a 
surrender of German forces in Italy.”—Center for the Study of Intelligence119 
 
Behaviors that were clearly rewarded in this case study are strong judgment and 
consistency. Throughout his time in Bern, Dulles had proved he had good intuition and 
produced results that his policy-makers directed. When it became necessary for him to 
stand up against orders and recommend a different course of action, they trusted his 
judgment. He gained credibility and used it exactly when he needed to, establishing a 
precedent of deferring to the person on the ground. Without such confidence, success is 
much less likely. 
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The outcome of surrender was also obviously rewarded. The Allies proved 
trustworthy and consistent throughout the negotiations, seen by how Dulles actually 
carried the authority he represented, and how they protected the negotiators and helped 
them escape a dangerous situation in Italy after signing. This consistency by Allied forces 
gained valuable credibility that would save lives on both sides in later negotiations. 
 
Impact 
“Countless thousands of parents would bless were they privileged to know what you have 
done.”—Brigadier General John Magruder120 
 
The importance of this operation is nuanced. Without a surrender of German 
forces in Italy, the war would have extended by months at least. It was clear that the tide 
was turning in favor of the Allied forces, but Hitler and Germany still had several 
strongholds they intended to fight for until no choice was left. 
This victory was just as much about the territory the Allies gained and the troops 
they prevented from fighting as it was about the blow to the morale Nazi Germany and 
Hitler’s grand strategy. The idea that German generals would break with Hitler and give 
up crucial territory to the Allies signaled the death knell of Nazi Germany. Victory in 
Europe would shortly follow. 
 















































Chapter 5: Burma 
Morale Operations (MO) 
“The process of creating black propaganda is subtle, not heroic, tricky, not courageous, 
and yet in the right hands its cumulative effect can be devastating.”—Ann Todd121 
 
With never more than 120 Americans, Detachment 101 operated on the ground in 
Burma, one of few OSS outposts in the Pacific Theater.122 They “gathered tactical 
intelligence, rescued downed fliers, and attacked the enemy when and where he was 
vulnerable.”123 Detachment 101 was a unit focused on Morale Operations (MO):  
“The Morale Operations Branch (MO) split from SO in 1943 to perform the 
“black” propaganda mission left behind in OSS when COI had been split the 
previous year. “Black” propaganda was supposed to look like it came from 
Germans or Japanese who were disgruntled with the war. It was intended to lower 
the morale of Axis troops and increase civilian resistance to the regimes in Berlin 
and Tokyo.”124 
It is difficult to narrow Detachment 101’s operations to a single mission, as the 
trial and error within their operation is what made them so effective. But for the purposes 
of this report, the mission overview will limit itself to two operations, to be referred to in 




Operation Black Mail 
“But there is another element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack 
against the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation.”—William Donovan125 
 
 
Illustration 5.1: OSS Black Mail Production Process126 
Over 500 Japanese postcards were intercepted on the eve of the battle at Myitkina, 
and they would serve to inspire Betty McIntosh to devise a plan of getting black MO into 
the Japanese Mainland.127 This was not a completely new idea, as the Soviets and British 
had similar operations in different theaters, with the technique being described as, 
“…extremely indifferent, often containing no obvious political propaganda.”128 
Betty and her Detachment 101 compatriot, Bill, devised two main themes for the 
postcards, “…the [Imperial Japanese Army] in Burma was underequipped and being 
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defeated; U.S. bombers passed overhead daily to mass for bombings of Japan, and 
soldiers were unsettled by rumors of strikes on the home islands. Underlying the 
message: The war is lost.”129 The success of this operation hinged on the believability of 
the new postcards, dependent largely on the OSS officers’ understanding of Japanese 
culture. Detachment 101 slipped the altered mail into the Japanese mail system, “Mission 
accomplished… Every reason to believe material will reach its destination.”130 Soon after 
Betty and her team would acquire a stack of letters from the Japanese mainland to 
soldiers at the front, and the process would be repeated.131 
 
Operation Gold-Dust: Reimagining Surrender 
“…there are no grave crews assigned to count the doubts and troubles planted in men’s 
minds that can make them lose the will to fight.”—Betty McIntosh132 
 
The largest issue surrounding Japanese surrender was the prejudice and 
perceptions on both sides. The Allied forces believed the Japanese could not and would 
not surrender. And if the Japanese were able to overcome deep-seeded cultural bias 
against surrendering, the Japanese did not believe the Allies would honor their surrender. 
With both sides expecting a trick, achieving surrender would be difficult. 
Having spent time with the Japanese, Betty McIntosh knew their must be a way to 
culturally accommodate surrender, and after considerable debate, she and her team 
realized that orders would overcome anything.133 Thus, if the Japanese soldier received 
an order that surrender was acceptable if certain conditions are met, he would be able to 
do so while maintaining his honor. Betty decided that developing a convincing message 
would require input from actual Japanese soldiers. 
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Betty and teammate Bill then travelled to a camp, Red Fort, in search of Japanese 
POWs.134 Through luck and fate, they found a prisoner who had been a middle school 
classmate of Bill in Japan, Mr. Okamoto.135 Okamoto embraced the surrender idea, and 
joined the team.136 Code-named Operation Gold-Dust, they perfected the order and 
disseminated through mailbags, placement them on dead couriers, and airdrops. A copy 
was even picked up by the War Office “white propagandists” who believed the order was 
real and published it as well.137 White propaganda accidentally picking up black 
propaganda is sometimes called “drinking our own bathwater.” 
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A Profile: Elizabeth “Betty” P. McIntosh 
“Never again would I feel so alive, so completely engaged in something I know would 








Before the war, Betty McIntosh lived and worked in Hawaii. Even before the war, 
she did everything she could to be a good reporter and seek out adventure. Experiencing 
Pearl Harbor, she helped in the hospitals, wrote about her experiences, and decided she 
wanted to do more. OSS recruiters sought her out because of her language skills, and she 
quickly found her place in the OSS.140 
McIntosh embodies the characteristics of the OSS and the personality essential to 
success. Her creativity and thoughtful understanding of culture and context helped her 
succeed in the OSS. She was determined to succeed and was not afraid of danger. A 
journalist who happened to speak Japanese, she was not trained to be a spy, but had skills 




“The immediate goal is not winning but rather not losing.”—Ann Todd141 
 
The risk/gain analysis within MO operations is unique. First, there is a low risk to 
force. In MO, significantly fewer lives are at risk than in traditional warfare. Betty’s 
mission was by no means easy, and Detachment 101 was purposely stationed within 
enemy territory and ahead of the Allied front, so they did see their fare share of risk, but 
the individual missions hinged on developing plans, creating postcards and leaflets to be 
delivered. So only those involved in dissemination of material faced a direct threat while 
executing these operations. 
Second, risk to mission was minimal. Failure is considerably less costly in these 
MO operations. The Japanese soldiers expected attempts to confuse and lower morale. If 
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the mission failed, they could try again with a different approach. While they would need 
to maximize limited materials, the mission itself would not be compromised by failure.  
 
Success 
“In MO work, we must not restrain our imaginations. Out of twenty wild schemes, there 
might be one that would really work—and save lives.”—Betty McIntosh142 
 
As with all MO operations, success is often intangible. But evidence of the 
success of Operation Gold-Dust found its way back to Betty and her team quickly, “Word 
filtered back from the field: an increasing number of Japanese were reportedly feigning 
unconsciousness, and a growing number of those captured agreed to let the Red Cross 
send their names back to Japan. The most gratifying news was that the Japanese who 
surrendered to Detachment 101 were carrying the leaflets.”143 
Betty and her team did not need to win a battle. The results of their work would 
not be immediate. But their goal was to change the average Japanese soldier’s perception 
on surrender. This was success because when and if he was captured, the battle might end 
sooner, and lives on both sides could be saved, rather than fruitlessly fighting to the 
death. 
Operation Black Mail had even less demonstrable success. Success within this 
mission was to chip away at a seemingly insurmountable obstacle of surrender so that 
later negotiations would fare better, especially on the mainland, which heretofore had 
been untouchable. 
“Their job was to bend all their creative energies to destroying the morale of the 
Japanese soldier, as well as his family back home, infecting both with defeatism 
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and a burning desire to end the war. The goal was to deceive and trick the enemy 
into surrendering, thereby saving many lives on both sides.”144 
 
Reward 
“MO had its own unique requirements, first and foremost a willingness to toil at 
something for which there would be no rewards, not even intangible ones.”—Ann Todd145 
 
It was difficult for the administration in D.C. to understand the importance of 
Detachment 101’s operations in Burma. Betty even wrote herself, “When the man with 
the military mind hammers on his desk and demands a set of figures to prove what MO 
did in Burma, no one, not even the Japs themselves can produce anything concrete for the 
Washington records.”146 They operated so independently that behaviors and outcomes to 
be rewarded would mostly be within the unit. However, Detachment 101 eventually 
received a Presidential Unit Citation, so by the end of the war, their efforts would be 
rewarded.147  
Creativity and cultural understanding were rewarded in Detachment 101. That is 
why they were chosen by the OSS and stationed there. Teamwork was another rewarded 
behavior. Both of these operations were successful not because of an individual, but 
because of a team tackling a problem together and pooling all of their resources and 






“The only beaches stormed are the minds of an invisible enemy.”—Ann Todd148 
 
As mentioned multiple times, success and impact are hard to measure in MO. Its 
impact can most clearly be seen through its growing position of relevance throughout the 
war. MO operations gained credibility with each barely perceptible success, and by the 
end of the war, many of its opponents began to see its value: 
 “Eventually MO’s early critics came to value its services, which included rumors 
about Hitler’s health and sanity, vast quantities of subversive leaflets, stickers, 
and slogans, and fake German newspapers and radio broadcasts (featuring, for 
instance, Marlene Dietrich singing “Lilli Marlene”). By the end of the war, MO 
and its companion civilian and military agencies had convinced policymakers in 
Washington that modern wars need to be fought in the "psychological" as well as 
military and economic arenas.”149 
The future of MO operations most directly translates to the concept of “winning 
the hearts and minds.” John F. Kennedy discusses the importance of this concept in 
success in Latin America, “Perhaps most significant of all is a change in the hearts and 
minds of the people — a growing will to develop their countries."150 Lyndon Baines 
Johnson reintroduced the strategy as winning the hearts and mind two decades later 
describing Vietnam, “So we must be ready to fight in Viet-Nam, but the ultimate victory 
will depend upon the hearts and the minds of the people who actually live out there. By 
helping to bring them hope and electricity you are also striking a very important blow for 
the cause of freedom throughout the world.”151  
Psychological warfare cannot be ignored in modern conflict. “Winning the Hearts 
and Minds of the populace” would be included in the Army and Marine Corps revised 
“Counterinsurgency Field Manual” in 2006.152 And it is reintroduced by General Stanley 
McChrystal in 2009, “What I'm really telling people is the greatest risk we can accept is 
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to lose the support of the people here… If the people are against us, we cannot be 
successful. If the people view us as occupiers and the enemy, we can't be successful and 
our casualties will go up dramatically."153 While each of these leaders and conflicts 
approached winning hearts and minds differently, and to varying degrees of success, its 
continuing presence represents its relevance.  
This is more than just convincing people. It is most effective when serving to 
change perspectives and amplifying truths. What this case study examined took place in 
the jungles of Burma, but today ripples run from PSYOPS to social media. While it is 
impossible to measure the corrosive effects of MO operations on the perspectives of the 
Japanese soldiers, without these operations the loss of life would have likely been much 
higher. Detachment 101 measured the risk and the possibility of success made it worth it, 
aiding the Allies in winning the war more quickly, just as such risks are taken to reduce 
losses in modern conflict. And their most powerful weapon of truth maintains its position 
even today. 
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Chapter 6: China 
A Road Less Travelled 
“We were treated by everyone very well and I hope that we have laid a good foundation 




Illustration 6.1: Tolstoy and Dolan in Tibet155 
In China’s fight against Japan, a connecting route from India for supplies was 
absolutely necessary. When Japanese forces cut-off use of the Burma Road, Chinese 
forces could only receive minimal Allied supplies delivered by a dangerous flight path 
over the Himalayan Mountains, a route later nicknamed the “Hump.”156  
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Ilia Tolstoy and Captain Brooke Dolan were OSS officers chosen to solve this 
problem. They would seek to find a new route through “hidden country” and to do so, 
they would need the permission of the 7-year-old Dalai Lama. 
Arriving in Tibet, they were welcomed and treated very gracefully, receiving the 
special honor of being allowed to ride their horses up to the Dalai Lama’s residence.157 
Of the Dalai Lama, Tolstoy said the following, “His Holiness was seated cross-legged, a 
high-peaked yellow hat on his head. We were immediately impressed by his young but 
stern face and not at all frail constitution. His cheeks were a healthy pink.”158  
 
 
Illustration 6.2: The Young Dalai Lama159 
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Then began the traditional gift-giving, “Tolstoy proceeded through the tradition of 
offering gifts to the Dalai Lama—bread and butter followed by an image of Buddha, a 
religious book, and a chorten (a Buddhist reliquary). Then, for the first time in history, he 
made direct contact between the Dalai Lama and the President of the United States by 
passing a letter written by FDR to the young leader.”160 The letter from FDR is recorded 
below: 
 
“Washington, July 3, 1942. 
Your Holiness: Two of my fellow countrymen, Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan, 
hope to visit your Pontificate and the historic and widely famed city of Lhasa. 
There are in the United States of America many persons, among them myself, 
who, long and greatly interested in your land and people, would highly value such 
an opportunity. 
As you know, the people of the United States, in association with those of twenty-
seven other countries, are now engaged in a war which has been thrust upon the 
world by nations bent on conquest who are intent upon destroying freedom of 
thought, of religion, and of action everywhere. The United Nations are fighting 
today in defense of and for preservation of freedom, confident that we shall be 
victorious because our cause is just, our capacity is adequate, and our 
determination is unshakable. 
I am asking Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to convey to you a little gift in token 
of my friendly sentiment toward you. 
With cordial greetings [etc.] 
Franklin D. Roosevelt “161 
 
It is interesting to note that Roosevelt took special care to acknowledge and 
address the Dalai Lama in his religious position rather than his political position, 
anticipating the conflict the situation could cause with China if mishandled.162 They 
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ultimately received permission to access the route and continue their travels, reportedly 
the first such permission in 22 years.163 
They would travel for 5 months to arrive at their destination and complete the 
route.164 Dolan actually recorded pieces of their journey on film, which can be accessed 





A Profile: Brooke Dolan 
““Before leaving here for Philadelphia, Mr. Dolan said he would gladly return to Tibet, 
which he regarded as ‘one of the finest countries in the world.’”—The New York Times166 
 
 
Illustration 6.3: Tolstoy, Dolan, and a guide167 
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Brooke Dolan was an explorer before he became an OSS officer. He had 
completed several expeditions to China and had even travelled to Tibet. He was known 
for the specimens of animals he collected for museums, especially “exceedingly rare 
high-altitude Asian mammals and birds,” many of which are still on display today.168 
Dolan is an excellent example of an OSS officer recruited for his skill set. 
Without his prior knowledge and experience from travelling through Asia, his mission 
would have been much harder. He found a way to continue researching and exploring 
while also defending a country he loved. Unfortunately, he died in China in August 1945, 




”This office, therefore, requests that the State Department should instruct the head of its 
diplomatic mission in New Delhi, India, to expedite the obtaining of a permit from the 
British authorities in India for Ilia Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to enter Tibet, by way of 
India, and to be allowed freedom of travel in Tibet in so far as the British are able to 
grant it without the necessity of returning to India.”—William Donovan170 
 
This operation involved many pitfalls. It would be difficult to cultivate a new 
relationship with the isolated Tibet without offending China. However, the need for 
supplies was desperate, and the supplies would considerably improve conditions for the 
Chinese forces, so the calculus was made that it was worth the risk.  
This mission was given to the OSS because a unique solution was needed to a 
unique problem. The journey would be difficult. Tolstoy and Dolan faced the extreme 
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context of the unknown. Unknown allies, unknown enemies, and an unknown path lay in 
front of them. 
 
Success 
“While the route was never employed during the war—a diplomatic crisis prevented its 
use, and planes continued to fly “the hump” across the Himalayan mountains—Tolstoy 
and Brooke made history, bridging two cultures that before had never formally met.”—
Hillary Parkinson171 
 
The crucial point in this operation was meeting with the Dalai Lama. That 
meeting alone would determine success. Without his approval, they would not have been 
able to travel through Tibet. Therefore the mission was largely a diplomatic mission. 
Ironically, the route that Tolstoy and Dolan found would ultimately not be used 
by military forces. This does not, however, make this mission a failure, “While the route 
was never employed during the war—a diplomatic crisis prevented its use, and planes 
continued to fly “the hump” across the Himalayan mountains—Tolstoy and Brooke made 







“This mission is of strategic importance and we hope will prove of long term value in the 
furtherance of the war effort in the Asiatic theatre.”—William Donovan173 
 
The behaviors that Dolan and Tolstoy exhibited in order to be chosen for the 
mission were the same behaviors that were ultimately rewarded. Dolan’s sense of 
adventure and exploration helped him make contacts in their journey and travel 
efficiently. Tolstoy’s diplomatic prowess allowed him to gain the trust of the Tibetan by 
writing to Donovan in order to acquire radios that they wanted and needed.174 
These agents would be sent on to other missions in their specialties having gained 
the trust of Donovan and FDR. Though the outcome of the route was not the solution, 
beginning a positive diplomatic relationship with Tibet would serve to facilitate better 
communication in the future. 
 
Impact 
“The commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well a s material, constitute what 
is called total war.”—William Donovan175 
 
The impact of this mission was small compared to many of the other case studies 
in this report. This mission was chosen to represent individuals who accomplished what 
many thought was impossible, and who’s individuality was representative of the culture 
of the OSS. Though the initiation of relations between the U.S. and Tibet and the creation 
of the route may not have been utilized by operations in WWII, this operation laid the 
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groundwork for later CIA operations in the region and U.S. foreign policy. The time 
horizon of this mission was long reaching, as were many other OSS operations in WWII. 
WWII was not won in a single elaborate mission. It was won through a series of 
small missions, such as this one, adding up until the pressure could only result in enemy 
capitulation; these missions that would lay the foundation for the future of foreign policy. 
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“We have come to the end of an unusual experiment. This experiment was to 
determine whether a group of Americans constituting a cross section of racial origins, of 
abilities, temperaments and talents could meet and risk an encounter with the long-
established and well- trained enemy organizations….”—William Donovan176  
 
These case studies explored different missions and examined the characteristics of 
individual OSS officers in order to identify elements and characteristics of success. The 
OSS was born in an extreme context, which would shape the organizations that became 
its legacy and the individuals who would become its life-blood, especially in the CIA. As 
it attempted to implement its mission in peacetime, the CIA would inherit the culture and 
risk tolerance that emerged from the OSS in WWII, embodying similar characteristics in 
strengths and weaknesses. 
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Chapter 7: A Legacy that Still Echoes 
Consequences of an Extreme Context 
“The answer is simple. The CIA is no aberrant mutation of ‘Donovan’s Dreamers’; it is 
in many ways the mirror image of OSS.”—R. Harris Smith177 
 
Though the legacy of the OSS left ripples in organizations from the State 
Department to Special Forces, the legacy is most clearly reflected within the CIA. 
Indelibly shaped by experiences and a risk tolerance developed in WWII, the CIA is 
predisposed to certain mistakes and successes. A risk tolerance developed from the 
extreme environment of war resulted in a risk prone approach, costly in peacetime. But 
this same inheritance also allowed the CIA to attract and cultivate innovative and critical 
thinkers who can continue to achieve the impossible. The organization’s greatest strength 
in bold and independent officers can also be its greatest weakness.  
President Truman disbanded the OSS on September 20, 1945, and its most 
successful sections would be distributed to other government departments.178 Truman’s 
order to Donovan is shown in Appendix D. Soon after, the beginning of the Cold War 
would demonstrate that intelligence collection was still needed, so the White House 
would establish the National Intelligence Authority that included a Central Intelligence 
Group, “These were stopgap measures that proved inadequate substitutes for OSS. The 
following year, Congress provided for the creation of a Central Intelligence Agency.”179 
Skills and operational methods developed in wartime would suddenly be the tool 
kit of a peacetime organization. Former OSS officers would staff the new CIA. The same 
people would be doing the same jobs, just under a different title outside of the extreme 
circumstances of WWII, “CIA officials who ‘had been in the OSS during World War II 
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and had worked with the resistance in Europe and Asia’ were responsible for planning the 
ill-fated invasion of Cuba. In Southeast Asia and elsewhere, former OSS men who had 
once aided underground partisans became leading experts on counterinsurgency and the 
suppression of left-wing rebellions.”180  
The CIA’s willingness to pursue nearly impossible missions was inevitably 
accompanied by a willingness to accept extreme risk that was less defensible in a time of 
peace: 
“Even more fundamental was the CIA’s inherited justification for clandestine 
political operations unrelated to espionage and intelligence analysis. There had 
been no doubt as to the ethics of OSS foreign interventionism in the course of the 
battle against fascism. Yet CIA received, as a matter of unquestioned right, the 
same mantle of morality. The most notorious CIA-fomented coups in Latin 
America, Asia, and the Middle East were, technically speaking, only extensions 
of Donovan’s mandate for political warfare. The secret service remained the 
same—only the world had changed.”181 
While this may be true, it is important to note that the CIA only undertakes covert 
action operations as directed and also approved by the executive branch, often bearing the 
blame in failure and rarely receiving the credit in success. This was especially true in the 
Bay of Pigs where senior levels of the Executive Branch, which approved the operation, 
took little responsibility. But the CIA does bear the responsibility of appropriately 
evaluating and communicating the risks in the decision-making process, and the decision-
maker cannot make an accurate decision without this information. 
The organizational culture of the OSS had the unmistakable imprint of the 
“Glorious Amateurs,” both good and bad. Organizationally, the configuration would 
mirror that of the OSS; “CIA inherited from OSS the crucial Donovan principle of 
merging Secret Intelligence and Special Operations in the same organization. The 
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functional titles changed to Foreign Intelligence and Covert Action but the theory was the 
same: to centralize all clandestine operations in a single bureaucracy.”182   
 
Replicating Success Today 
“We were not afraid to make mistakes because we were not afraid to try things that had 
not been tried before.”—William Donovan183 
 
One of the most essential elements of success within both the OSS and the CIA is 
a developed credibility, allowing policy makers to trust of the judgment of those on the 
ground. Officers defer to the policy-maker, but the policy-maker cannot make effective 
decisions and take effective action without trusting the operators on the ground. The 
process is at its weakest when this trust is strained. 
Measures of risk developed in the extreme context of war, would need to find 
their place in peacetime intelligence operations, but the CIA also learned from many of 
the lessons the OSS had already worked through. Donovan’s determination, Colby’s 
fearlessness, Dulles’ understanding of people, McIntosh’s creativity, Dolan’s passion, 
and the characteristics of so many other OSS officers reflect in the CIA today. The CIA 
will continue to make new mistakes as they try to move impossible situations. Embracing 
its resourceful and self-motivating spirit, individuals in the CIA would be trained to take 
on the most complex issues, finding a solution in situations deemed impossible.  
As taught by those who came before, these descendants of the OSS would make 
the calculus of risk to determine what losses could be worth the success. And risk 
calculation will always be a key issue. The OSS was given the hard tasks, with little 
chance of success; the CIA is often given the same. Without individuals willing to take 
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the risk and make mistakes, there will not be individuals who are able to take the risks to 
achieve the greatest successes. Individuals at the CIA operate with a risk tolerance and 
foreign policy set by the executive branch. The legacy of the OSS created an organization 
that preserved a “can do” spirit. A common phrase at the CIA, “you’re smart, figure it 
out,” can only be successful within appropriate risk parameters set by the highest levels 
of the Executive Branch. But in order to fully utilize the CIA and its resources, the 
President must continually re-evaluate and define that risk tolerance. Risk can be 
reduced, but never fully eliminated. Situations require action in the midst of that risk, and 
in order for the individuals of the CIA to independently act when necessary, they need 
clearly defined parameters of risk. 
The legacy of the OSS will continue to echo in the halls of the George Bush 
Center for Intelligence and in the operations of the CIA for years to come, as they 
continue to collect and analyze information to protect Americans. To close, Donovan 
summarized of efforts of the OSS in a memo as it was being disbanded at the end of the 
war, “At all times I ask you to bear in mind that the Office of Strategic Services was 
created as a war agency. It had, and it has now, no other mandate. It was created solely to 
hasten the defeat of our enemies. That job is done.”184 The CIA carries on that mission 
today. 
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by correctly foreseeing, what is coming, to anticipate 
developments and thereby to gain an advantage which 
our opponents cannot overcome on the field ot battle. 
That is what the future expects us to do.• 
Although we are racing imminent peril , we 
are lacking in effective service tor analyzing, compre-
hending, and appraising such information as we might 
obtain (or in some oases have obtained), relative to 
the intention ot potential enemies and the limit ot the 
economic and military resources ot those enemies . Our 
mechanism ot collect ing information is inadequate . It 
is t rue we have intelligence units in the Army and t he 
Navy. We can assume that through these units our fight-
ing services can obtain technical information in time 
of peace, have available immediate operational informa-
tion in time or war, and, on certain occasions , obtain 
11 spot" news as to enemy movements. But these services 
cannot, out of the very nature of things, obtain that 
accurate, comprehensive, long-range informat ion without 
which no strategic board oan plan for the future . And 
we have arrived at the moment when there must be plans 
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